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CASE NOTE
NARROWING "NAVIGABLE WATERS": THE FIFTH CIRCUIT LIMITS FEDERAL
JURISIDICTION UNDER THE CLEAN WATER AND THE OIL POLLUTION ACTS
In re Needham'
I. INTRODUCTION
"'Navigable waters" is defined in the Clean Water and Oil Pollution Acts as "waters of the United States,
including territorial seas. 2 The Supreme Court has held that Congress intended to broadly define "water" in
the Acts.' Although the broad definition of -waters of the United States" may appear straightforward, the
courts' application of this definition has been anything but clear and consistent.4
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On January 25. 1999. an employee of Needham Resources, Inc. ("NRI") pumped oil from an oil
containment well into an adjacent drainage ditch.) After receiving a complaint regarding the oil spill, the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA-) investigated the spill and contacted James Needham to discuss the
matter. NRI initially hired a private contractor to clean up the oil, but did not have the funds to complete the
operation. The EPA and the United States Coast Guard assumed control of the cleanup, an effort that was
funded by the Oil Spill Liability Act.8
The Needhams filed for bankruptcy on February 8, 1998.9 The following day, the United States sued the
Needhams. NRI and D&C in federal court to recoup the $207,000 it spent in cleanup costs.'0 The government's
suit was stayed until resolution of the government's proof of claim against the Needhams on the same issue in
the bankruptcy court dispute.'' The Needhams objected to the EPA's proof of claim on the grounds that the oil.
spill was not regulated by the OPA because the spill did not infiltrate any navigable waters that were subject to
federal jurisdiction. -
At the bankruptcy hearing, both parties stipulated that the oil was originally discharged into a drainage
ditch at the well. spilled into an adjacent waterway, the Bayou Cutoff, and then spilled into another adjacent
waterway. the Bayou Folse.'3 It is undisputed that the "Bayou Folse flows directly into the Company Canal, an
industrial waterway that eventually flows into the Gulf of Mexico."' 4
354 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 2003).
33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000). See also 33 U.S.C. §2701(14)(2000).
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.. 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985).
4 United States v. Rapanos. 339 F.3d 447. 451 (6th Cir. 2003).




8 Id. The Coast Guard. along with the EPA. incurred S207,000 in cleanup costs. Id.
Id. The Needhams originally filed a Chapter II bankruptcy petition which was later converted to Chapter 7. Id.
10 Id.
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The bankruptcy court found that the drainage ditch and its adjacent waterway. the Bayou Cutoff, were
neither navigable waters. nor sufficientlv adjacent to navigable waters as required for the Act to control.15 The
court. accordingly. sustained the Needham's objection to the EPA's proof of claim. finding that the oil spill was
not subject to federal jurisdiction.'" Without jurisdiction, the OPA could not compel the Needhams to pay for
the cleanup.' 7
The district court affirmed. finding no basis to disturb the ruling of the bankruptcy court." The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals found error \\ith the bankruptcy court's two critical findings of fact: (1) that the oil
spilled only into the drainage ditch and its adjacent waterway. the Bayou Cutoff. neither of which were
navigable in fact: and (2) *-that the Gulf of Mexico was the only open body of navigable water in the vicinity of
the spill.-",
111. 1 1.c.'i BACKGROLND
I. I/1th Oil Pollut/ion/Aci
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 VOPA') was intended to streamline federal law and enhance the
Enironmental Protection Auency's ability to prevent and respond to catastrophic oil spills in several ways.21
The OPA created the national Oil Spill Liabilit\ Trust Fund to assist with cleanup costs when a responsible
party is unable or unwMillinu to clean up oil spills."2 The OPA set new requirements for contingency planning by
both the industry and the uoN ernment.- The OPA also increased noncompliance penalties, broadened the
response and enforcement of the federal government. and preserved the state's authority to promulgate laws
reCulating the prel ention of and response to oil spills.24
The OPA imposes strict liabilit\ upon parties responsible for discharging oil into "navigable waters."25
--Nax igable waters" is defined in the statute to mean ",the waters of the United States, including the territorial
seas.-' 'he leuislativc histor\ and the identical text strongly indicate that Congress intended the meaning of
na\icable waters- to be the same in both the OPA the Clean Water Act.
- 3 S~. ~~ -0l -276 (2000).
Rice . Harken Exploration Co.. 250 F.3d 264. 266 (5th Cir. 2001). The OPA was promulgated largely in response to increased
public concern following the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound. Alaska. Id.
- U.S. Environmental Protection 4cenc\. Oil Po/uion Act Overviewi. at http:"www.epa.gov/oilspill/opaover.htm (last updated Jan.
7. 2004). This trust tind is financed b\ an oil tax and can provide up to SI billion per oil spill incident. Id.
Id.
-Id.
In re Needham. 354 F.3d 340. 344 Oth Cir. 2003).
hi. (citing! 33 U.S.C. § 2701(2 1) (2000)).
I. See a.% Rice. 250 F.' d it 267.
49
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B. The (lean Water .Acr
Congress passed the Clean Water Act ("CWA") "to restore and maintain the chemical. physical. and
biological integrity of the Nation's waters."2 and gave the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the EPA the
authority to achieve this task.30 The CWA was originally enacted as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of
1972 "to provide a comprehensive national. interstate solution for a perceived national [water pollution
crisis]." 3 ' For over thirty years, the agencies of the executive branch and the federal courts have construed the
geographic jurisdiction of the CWA.' During that time. it vas clear that the entire CWA had one unilied
jurisdiction based on one statutory definition of *navigable waters" as "the waters of the United States.
The legislative history of the CWA shows that Congress intended to broaden federal regulation over the
nation's waters.34 This is further evidenced by eliminating words in a limiting definition used in prior similar
acts to give the broad definition of "the waters of the United States."" This definition of -navigable waters-
was new to Congress who. in prior acts. defined navigable waters as those that \\ere "navigable-in-fact.-'6
Thus, the interpretation of this new Congressional definition of "navigable waters- was also new to the courts.
C. "Navigable Waters- and Federal Iurisdiction
The definition of "navigable waters" in the CWA and OPA has recently been heavily debated in the
courts. In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homues. the Supreme Court considered the proper interpretation of
the definition of "navigable waters" as -"waters of the United States" as w\ell as the scope of federal jurisdiction
under the CWA.n In reviewing congressional legislative intent, the Court found that "Congress chose to define
the waters covered by the Act broadly" in order "to regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed
'navigable' under the classical understanding of that term.' The Court interpreted "waters of the United
States" broadly so as to include "all wetlands adjacent to other bodies of water over which the Corps has
jurisdiction" and upheld CWA regulations that restricted discharging pollutants into non-navigable wvetlands
adjacent to open waters. 39 In the wake of Riverside. it \\as well recognized that -navigable waters." as defined
2833 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387.
29 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
30 United States v. Deaton. 332 F.3d 698. 702 (4th Cir. 2003) tholding that the Corps should he _isen deference in asserting
jurisdiction over a roadside ditch).
' Lance D. Wood, Don't Be Mis/ed: CIWA Jurisdiction Exiends in ./I \ on-.\ avighale Tribuaries iIOthe Taditional vvah/e WVaters
and to Their Adjacent Wetlands. 34 ENvTL. L. RPT. 10187. 10193 (Feb. 2004). Prior to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. the
United States relied on a compilation of state. local. and federal statutes. including common law "nuisance" remedies. which were
largely ineffective in dealing with interstate water pollution. h. See also John E. Milner & Charles A. Waggoner. Overview of.1/u!jor
Federal Environmental Acts and Regulations for the General Practitioner. 60 Miss. L.J. 1. 89-91 (990).
32 Wood, supra note 31, at 10195. The agencies accomplished this throuIgh rulemaking and the courts throug1h various decisions. /d.
Id. But see general/v Virginia S. Albrecht & Stephen M. Nickelsburg. Could SWANCC Be Right" .4 New Look at the Legisatiive
History of the Clean Water Act. 32 ENvTI.. L. R'i,. 11042 (Sept. 2002) (discussing limited jurisdiction under the CWA).
3 Wood, supra note 31, at 10199. The legislative history of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act shows Congress's focus on the
inadequacies of the Water Quality Act of 1965 as its starting point for expanding federal jurisdiction. Id. But see Albrecht &
Nickelsburg, supra note 33.
Id. The definition of "navigable waters" that was taken out of the bill before passage %%as -the navigable waters of the United
States, portions thereof, and the tributaries thereof. includinu the territorial seas and the Great Lakes.'~ Id.36 Id. at 10200.
37474 U.S. 121. 133 (1985).
39 Id.
9 Id. at 135. The wetland in Riverside actually abutted a na% igable waterwa\. I
50
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in the CWA, included tributaries.40  However, the Court's subsequent decision in Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps ofEngineers muddied the waters.
In Solid Waste, the Court found that certain isolated, non-navigable waters exceeded the boundaries of
the CWA.41 The Court refused to extend federal jurisdiction under the CWA to an abandoned sand and gravel
pit where migratory birds nested.42 The Corps originally concluded that it had no jurisdiction over the site,
because it was not a "wetland" or area which supported "vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil
conditions" as required by the Act.43 When the Corps was informed of a number of migratory birds at the site.
it reconsidered and ultimately asserted its jurisdiction pursuant to the Migratory Bird Rule. a subset of the CWA
promulgated by the Corps under its congressional authority.44 The Court held that using the Migratory Bird
Rule to acquire federal jurisdiction over the area exceeded the jurisdiction of the CWA.Y In reaching its
conclusion, the Court emphasized that the isolated bodies of water at issue were neither navigable-in-fact nor
were they adjacent to open water.46 The Court specifically stated that the meaning of "navigable waters- under
the Act was not before it and it expressed no opinion on its meaning. Solid Waste has rippled through the
lower courts in recent years, and. its holding has caused a split as to its interpretation to the definition of
"navigable waters." In interpreting Solid Waste, the courts have reached varying results, "the primary rift being
whether the Migratory Bird Rule was the decision's only casualty. or whether the holding limited the Corps'
jurisdiction even further."48
Shortly after the Supreme Court's decision, the Fifth Circuit found Solid Waste to be a limitation on
federal jurisdiction.49 In Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., the court held that oil discharges onto dry land which
eventually reach groundwater were not included in the definition of navigable waters under the OPA. and its
regulation should therefore be left to the states.s0 The Rice court interpreted Solid Wasie to limit the federal
jurisdiction and required navigable waters be either navigable-in-fact, or adjacent to such navigable-in-fact
waters.51 However, the Fifth Circuit is the only appellate court to interpret Solid Waste as a limitation on the
expansive definition of "navigable waters" set out in Riverside.'2
The Fourth Circuit held that the broad jurisdiction of the CWA still applied in light of Solid W4'asie. ;3 In
United States v. Deaton, the court acquiesced to the CWA's jurisdiction over wetlands that are "adjacent to. and
drain into, a roadside ditch whose waters eventually flow into" a navigable river and bay.54 In its ruling. the
40 United States v. Phillips, 367 F.3d 846, 856-57 (9th Cir. 2004). The court noted that tributaries have been included in the rneaninu
of "navigable waters" undei the CWA since 1975. Id. (citing Riverside. 474 U.S. at 123-23).
4' 531 U.S. 159. 172-74 (2001). Solid Waste did not overturn Riverside. In re Needham. 354 F.3d 340. 345 (5th Cir. 2003).42 Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 162.
43 Id. at 164 (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (1999)).
4 Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 164.
41Id. at 174.
46Id. at 168. The facts in Solid Waste are distinguishable from Riverside where the water was in fact adiacent to a navigable waterwa%.
Id. at 172-74. See also Needham. 354 F.3d at 345.
4 Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 171.
4 United States v. Lamplight Equestrian Ctr.. Inc.. 2002 WL 360652 at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8. 2002).
49 Rice v. Harken Exploration Co.. 250 F.3d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 2001).
so Id. at 271. The court also affirmed its earlier decision that groundwater was unregulated bN the CWA. Id. (citing Exxon Corp. v.
Train, 554 F.2d 1310, 1322 (5th Cir. 1977)).
" Id. at 269.
52 Where the Third Circuit had not ruled on the issue. a New Jersey district court followed the Rice court's interpretation of Solid
Waste. FD & P Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Army, Corps of Eng'rs, 239 F. Supp. 2d 509. 513-14 (D.N.J. 2003).
" United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698. 702 (4th Cir. 2003).
54 Id.
51
MELPR. Vol. 12. No. I
court said that the Corps was well within its delegated authority under the CWA to regulate non-navigable
tributaries and their adjacent wetlands.
The Sixth Circuit also applied broad federal jurisdiction under the CWA after the Solid Waste decision.5 6
In United States v. Rapanos. the court found federal jurisdiction under the CWA over wetlands that flow into a
man-made drain, which flows into a creek. which flows into a navigable river. In doing to, the court stated
that Solid Waste did not restrict the CWA's coverage to only wetlands that were adjacent to navigable waters.58
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, and held that Solid Waste did not narrow
the scope of the CWA.: In United Slates v. Phillips, the court concluded that a creek did not have to be
navigable-in-fact. and that a tributary could be considered navigable water.60 None of the waters in Deaton,
Rapanos or Phillips were navigable. or truly adjacent to navigable waters.6'
District courts with no direct appellate authority on an applicable "navigable waters" issue, subsequent
to Solid Waste. are also split as to the scope of the Supreme Court's ruling. Some courts have agreed with the
Fifth Circuit and limited federal jurisdiction under the CWA.62 while others have held that Solid Waste did not
narrow the breadth of the Act.63
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In appealing the bankruptcy court's decision, the United States challenged the court's conclusion that
the spilled oil did not contaminate waters regulated by the Oil Pollution Act ("OPA").64 Specifically, the
United States asserted that the oil was spilled into navigable-in-fact waters, or alternatively, into waters that
were adjacent to navigable \waters.6  The court ultimately agreed with the latter of the two arguments and
divided its opinion into two parts: (1) defining the OPA's jurisdiction;66 and (2) reviewing the bankruptcy
court's findings of fact.61
A. Defining "Navigable Waters "68
I. at 708.
United States v. Rapanos. 339 F.3d 447. 453 (6th Cir. 2003).
Id.
United States v. Phillips. 367 F.3d 846. 855-56 (9th Cir. 2004). See also Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526(9th Cir. 2001) (holding that polluted irrigation canals were "navigable waters" because they receive water from natural streams andlakes and release water to streams and creeks).
N Phillips. 367 F.3d at 855-56. The court affirmed the district court's decision which rejected applying a restricted definition of
navigable waters" under the CWA. Id. at 856.
In re Needham. 354 F.3d 340. 345 (5th Cir. 2003).
E.g.. FD & P Enters.. Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 239 F. Supp. 2d 509, 516 (D.N.J. 2003) (holding that Solid Waste
substantially altered the meaning of "navigable waters" by requiring a substantial nexus beyond a mere hydrological connection) andUnited States v. RGM Corp.. 222 F. Supp. 2d 780 (E.D. Va. 2002) (holding that the wetlands were not "navigable waters" under theCWA because they were not adjacent to navigable waters).
Eg.. United States v. Jones. 267 F. Supp. 2d 1349 (M.D. Ga. 2003). Carabell v. U. S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 257 F. Supp. 2d 917(E.D. Mich. 2003). United States v. Lamplight Equestrian Ctr.. Inc.. 2002 WL 360652 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2002), United States v.
Interstate Gen. Co., 152 F. Supp. 2d 843 (D. Md. 2001).
64 Needham. 354 F.3d at 344.
65 Id.
66(See id.
61 See id. at 346.
68 See Oil Pollution Act ("OPA"). 33 U.S.C. § 2701(21) (2000). The Fifth Circuit court reviewed the bankruptcy court's statutory
interpretation of the Act de novo. Needham, 354 F.3d at 344.
52
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When oil is discharged into *navigable waters." the OPA imposes strict liability upon the parties
responsible. Navigable waters are defined by the Act to mean -the waters of the United States, including the
territorial sea.-7 " The Fifth Circuit refused to approve the broad regulatory definition of "navigable waters" as
defined by the Act.7' although other circuits had recently done so. 72 The court specifically stated that the United
States cannot regulate such w\aters as puddles. sewers. and roadside ditches.73 The Fifth Circuit held that the
United States was only permitted to regulate bodies of water that are actually navigable or adjacent to navigable
waters.
B. Revicwing Findings of Fac/
The court used a clear error standard in reviewing, the facts found by the bankruptcy court, meaning that
it can only review if the lower court has made a clear and definite mistake.7 5 In its review, the two critical
factual areas the court focused on were: (I) the finding that the oil spilled only into the drainage ditch adjacent
to the well and Bayou Cutoff. neither of which were navigable-in-fact: and (2) that the Gulf of Mexico was the
onl\ open body of navigable w\ater in the vicinity of the spill.76 The court focused on the stipulations made at
the bankruptcx hearing in its factual revieW.
At the bankruptcy hearing. both parties stipulated that the oil was not only discharged into Bayou
Cutoff. but also into Bayou Folse. the furthest body of water from the source of the spill.78 The stipulation was
consistent with the eidence presented. and neither party asked that the stipulation be disregarded. In light of
the stipulation. the court found that the bankruptcy court should have established whether Bayou Folse, not
BaVou Cutoff. was navicable-in-fact or adjacent to an open navigable body of water.80
Inland w\aterwxaxs max fall within the definition of navigable waters -when they are used or are
susceptible of being used. in their ordinary condition. as highways for commerce. over which trade and travel
VI
are or max be conducted."' In relx ing on testimony from the bankruptcy hearing, the court concluded that it is
undisputed that Ba\ ou Folse is adjacent to the Company Canal.82 Like the Company Canal, inland waterways
that are unobstructed. traveled on \\ ith consistency and support commerce are navigable-in-fact.83
.\L'tchc.'. 354 F. 3D at 3 44.
/d. (qut0inu 13 1.S.C. 2701(21 )). This definition is consistent \\ ith the definition found in the Clean Water Act ("CWA").
eedhan. ;354 F.3d at 342. Sec alt Rice \. Harken Exploration Co.. 250 F.3d 264. 267 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7)).
Neither the OPA nor the C\\ A extend federal jurisdiction to the farthest reach of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 269-70.
.\eedhant. 354 -.3d at 345.
See United States \. Deaton. 3 2 F-3d 098. '02 O4th Cir. 2003) and United States v. Rapanos. 339 F.3d 447, 449 (6th Cir. 2003).




/J. Federal la\\ requires that Mtipulations of fact are controlling. conclusive. and must be enforced by the courts unless contrary
evidence or injustice is substantial. /J.
8" Id. -Under Rice. and in light of the stipulation. the proper inquiry is whether Bayou Folse." the furthest body of water affected by
the spill. -is navigable-in-fact or adjacent to an open body of navigable water." Id. (citing Rice v. Harken 250 F.3d 264, 269 (5th Cir.
2001)).
A. (quoting The Daniel Ball. 77 U.S. 557. 563(1871))
Id. at 347. A \w itness at the hearing stated that -Itlhe Company Canal is an industrial corridor ... contain[ing] shipyards, repair
facilities. dr\ docks land al gas freeing operation.- hI.
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The remaining question of fact for the court was whether the Bayou Folse was adjacent to the Company
Canal.84  For waters to be considered adjacent. the law requires a -significant nexus" between the water in
question and the navigable-in-fact water. 5 A witness testified at the bankruptcy hearing that Bayou Folse flows
directly into the Company Canal. proving that the two waters were clearly adjacent.86  Relying on the
stipulations made at the bankruptcy hearing and the corresponding witness testimony. the court reversed the
ruling of the bankruptcy court and held that the oil spill triggered federal jurisdiction pursuant to the OPA.8 '
V. COMMENT
In the wake of Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Counl v. United States .4Inny Corps of[Enginiers.
the circuits have split in deciding the jurisdictional scope of § 404 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA). Some
circuits have interpreted Solid Waste as narrowing federal jurisdiction by requiring water be navigable. or
adjacent to navigable waters, to be subject to federal regulation." In others. the courts have allowed \ irtually
limitless federal jurisdiction subjecting a remote. shallow drainage ditch eight miles from the closest navigable
water to the federal law.90
Regulatory agencies have not provided any clarification for landowners as to the federal government's
jurisdiction under the CWA.91 In a joint statement by the Environmental Protection Agency and the Army
Corps of Engineers given on the same day the In re Needhai decision was released. the agencies stated that
they would not promulgate any rules on activities in isolated wetlands. ') Instead. the agencies will leave the
decision to the courts to decide on a case-by-case basis whether federal jurisdiction applies and what activities
may be allowed in wetlands. 93 Without further guidance. the judiciary is likely to continue making inconsistent
and unpredictable decisions. 94
The courts that have found limited federal jurisdiction under the CWA have done so interpreting Solid
Waste as a significant shift in the boundaries of the CWA."'' The Fifth Circuit uses the most limiting
jurisdictional definition, providing that CWA regulation onl\ applies -1f the body of water is actually navigable
or is adjacent to an open body of navigable water..." The Third Circuit's New Jersev District Court also
followed the Fifth Circuit's lead. but in doine so relied on the district court's ruling in US v. Rapanos"' which
has since been overturned. 98
84 Id.
8 Id.96 id.
87 Id. The case was remanded for consideration of the Needham's remaininu2 defenses. Id.
88 FD & P Enters.. Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs. 239 F. Supp. 2d 509. 5 13 (D.N..J. 2003).
89 Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264. 269 (5th Cir. 2001). SLe AI.') FD ii ' tine1hr%.. 239 F. Supp. 2d at 513 (followinu
Rice).
9 United States v. Deaton. 332 F.3d 698. 712 (4th Cir. 2003). See also United States \. Rapanos. 339 F.3d 447. 453 (6th Cir. 2003)
(holding the CWA provided jurisdiction over wetlands that flow into a man-made drain. which tlows into a creek. which flows into a
navigable river).
91 Nat'l Ass'n of Homebuilders. NAHB Calis on SiU/remte Court in Define Federal .Jrisiction ( nder Clean 11aler Act. at




9s FD & P Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engurs. 239 F. Supp. 2d 509. 513 (D.N.J. 2003). See general/v Albrecht &
Nickelsburg, supra note 33 (discussing limited jurisdiction under the CWA).
9 Rice v. Harken Exploration Co.. 250 F.3d 264. 269 (5th Cir. 2001). id/oreS hy in re Needham. 354 F.3d 340. 346 (5th Cir. 2003)).
9 FD & P Enters.. Inc.. 239 F. Supp. 2d at 514.
98 United States v. Rapanos. 190 F. Supp. 2d 101 I (E.D. Mich. 2002). Overruied hv United States v. Rapanos. 339 F.3d 447. 454 (6th
Cir. 2003).
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The other side of the debate leaves the scope of the CWA's jurisdiction unchanged by the Solid Waste
decision. 99 The Ninth Circuit has concluded that Solid Waste applies to isolated waters with no hydrological
connection to navigable waters. 00 Other courts have interpreted Solid Waste to have changed the critical
jurisdictional issue as to whether there is a "significant nexus" between the wetlands at issue and navigable
waters, which has shown by these courts not to significantly alter the CWA's jurisdiction.o'0 Still other courts
have limited Solid Waste to its impact on 33 CFR § 328.3(a)(3) and have not extended it any further. 0 2
The decisions favoring broad jurisdiction of the CWA are further supported by two recent cases. In
United States v. Deaton, the Fourth Circuit held that the CWA applied to wetlands that are "adjacent to. and
drain into, a roadside ditch whose waters eventually flow into" a navigable river and bay. 0 3 In United Stwaes v.
Rapanos, the Sixth Circuit asserted authority under the CWA over wetlands that flow into a man-made drain.
which flows into a creek, which flows into a navigable river. Both the Deaton and Rapanos courts looked to
prior rulings and congressional intent to apply broad reaching federal authority under the CWA.
Congress passed the CWA with the goal of ending water pollution in the United States altogether by
1985.105 Case law prior to Solid Waste has provided the government with broad jurisdiction in using the CWA
to curtail water pollution.'06  Solid Waste specifically did not overturn any prior case law relying on the
expanded jurisdiction, but only ruled that a specific provision of the Act, the Migratory Bird Rule. did not give
rise to federal jurisdiction. 0 7
In adopting a narrow federal jurisdiction in Needham, the Fifth Circuit relies mainly on its own prior
holding in Rice.'08 However, the holding in Rice contradicts the congressional purpose of the OPA. According
to Rice "the OPA, like the CWA, does not extend federal regulation to the outermost limits of the Commerce
Clause." 09 Rice further stated that the OPA was passed in response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill and was
intended to provide quick and efficient cleanup and compensation for future oil spills. similar to Exxon Valdez.
and to internalize the costs of spills within the petroleum industry.'lo This conflicts with Congress's intent. as
interpreted by the Rice court, that the CWA and OPA have the same definition."' Since the Exxon Valdez oil
spill occurred in 1990,112 long after the CWA was last amended in 1977,' 13 Congress could not have intend to
create a narrower jurisdiction in the OPA than that of the CWA.
Further, Congress intended the CWA to broaden federal jurisdiction to include 'isolated waters.-' 1 4 The
legislative history of the 1972 and 1977 Amendments of the CWA focused on the inadequacies of the Water
Quality Act of 1965 as the starting point for expanding federal jurisdiction of the CWA. The legislature was
FD & P Enters., Inc., 239 F. Supp. 2d at 515.
' Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist.. 243 F.3d 526. 533-34 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that irrigation canals that -are tributaries
to the natural streams with which they exchange water" are "waters of the United States- and subject to the CWA).
'0 United States v. Lamplight Equestrian Ctr.. Inc. 2002 WL 360652 at *6 (N.D. III. 2002).
'02 United States v. Interstate Gen. Co.. 152 F. Supp. 2d 843, 847 (D. Md. 2001).
03 United States v. Deaton. 332 F.3d 698. 702 (4th Cir. 2003).
0 United States v. Rapanos, 339 F.3d at 447. 453 (6th Cir. 2003).
os FD & P Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs. 239 F. Supp. 2d 509. 515 (D.N.J. 2003).
0 Id.
07 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng"rs. 531 U.S. 159. 174 (2001). The Court held that providing
federal jurisdiction pursuant to the "Migratory Bird Rule- would exceed the Corps' authority under the CWA. Id.
'o In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340. 344 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Rice v. Harken Exploration Co.. 250 F.3d 264. 269-70 (5th Cir. 2001)).
'" Id.
'so Rice, 250 F.3d at 266.
" Id. at 267.
"2 Id. at 266.
" Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs. 531 U.S. 159. 187 (2001).
"
4 Id. at 177.
"5 Wood, supra note 31. at 10199.
55
MELIPR. Vol. 12. No. I
clear by removing the -navigable-in-fact" language ensuring that the CWA was to regulate all bodies of water
in the nation. not just those that are navigable-in-fact.1 Congress specifically changed the definition of
navigable waters from the prior Act. which is considered to be interpreted narrowly, to the broader definition of
..navigable waters of the United States."' 17
The Fifth Circuit has narrowly interpreted both the clear language of the CWA and OPA and the rulings
of the Supreme Court in Solid Wasie to hold that waters that are not navigable-in-fact, nor adjacent to such
waters, are not subject to federal jurisdiction.' It was an interesting coincidence that the EPA and the Corps
decided on the day that the Needhani opinion was released not to promulgate any rules further defining federal
jurisdiction in such cases. Certainly Congress did not intend some states to be subject to narrow jurisdiction
while others are afforded broad jurisdiction. Without agency guidance. nothing short of a Supreme Court ruling
vill clarify the scope of Solid Wasie and decide once and for all what is meant by "navigable waters".
VI. CONCLUSION
Whether the Fifth Circuit took the broad or narrow approach is of no consequence to the Needhams,
who Would have lost their argument under either interpretation. However, the decision to apply a narrow
federal jurisdiction of --navigable waters" has far reaching effects beyond the Needhams. Apparently citizens in
Georgia cannot expect federal intervention if a wetland that is not near a navigable-in-fact body of water
becomes polluted by a builder or corporation, those in California can rely on federal intervention, and those in
Missouri wvill have to wait and see what the Eighth Circuit decides when it gets its chance.
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